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Abstract 
Constantly envisioning how the rapid developments in information 
technology offer new opportunities, and engineering business processes 
accordingly will continue to be a difficult problem for senior manage- 
ment. An important observation by Keen (1991) is that over the last 
three decades, effective use of rapidly changing technology has lagged 
its availability. A central problem is that of justifying the technology, 
measuring its business value. The value-chain model articulated by 
Porter (1985) is a natural candidate in providing a basis for this eval- 
uation. It is based on the simple economic theory that a firm remains 
competitive by virtue of being a low cost producer or differentiating 
its products/services to the customer, that is, by providing customer 
satisfaction. It is intuitive to think of "the customer" as the end 
user of a product or service. However, projecting this definition into 
the organization, where all pieces of work within it have a customer 
that needs to be satisfied provides a good basis for work design and 
its implementation. As technology evolves, forcing the organization to 
reassess its customers, the work must be redesigned. This is becoming 
known increasingly as "process reengineering" . 
Porter's model has found widespread appeal among practitioners 
a t  the strategic level due t o  its theoretical simplicity and common- 
sense appeal. Several methodologies have been designed around this 
model that encourage executives to "think through" and identify tech- 
nologies that could provide competitive advantage. However, these 
methods have some serious limitations due to the lack of a sound 
conceptual underpinning and their inability to  link explicitly, technol- 
ogy to business value metrics. Based on an analysis of one specific 
industry (insurance) we have found that simple process oriented mod- 
els such as BSP, when extended to deal with value (in terms of cost 
or product/service differentiation to the customer), provide a sound 
basis for exploring process reengineering. An implementation of this 
methodology should enable management to  simulate how a system 
would "react" to various types of inputs in terms of specific metrics 
of interest. 
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1 Where Should Information Systems Plans 
Come From? 
The problem of evaluating information technology is a difficult one for sev- 
eral reasons. First, for technological leaders, there are several inherent risks 
involved such as whether customers will accept the innovation as planned, in 
implementing the technology, whether followers will quickly neutralize first 
mover advantages, and so on. The second difficulty is that investment in 
information technology is a timing problem, where costs, benefits, and risks 
are involved over a protracted time horizon. Since there is inherent uncer- 
tainty associated in making these estimates, assumptions and estimates must 
be constantly updated. The third difficulty is that investments directed at 
creating a technology platform do not have payoffs that can be envisioned 
except in a very general way. For example, a platform that enables several 
future applications to share data and processing capabilities is difficult to 
quantify even in terms of simple metrics if the specific applications have not 
yet been envisioned. In fact, Keen (1991) argues that in the longer run, senior 
management should really focus on the platform issues and not applications 
since it is the former that really provide sustainable competitive advantage. 
Given the inherent intractability of the evaluation problem, it is probably 
fruitless looking for "the best model" that measures the worth of information 
technology. Rather, it is probably more worthwhile developing a systematic 
methodology for enabling management to (1) focus on specific parts of the 
business which can be strengthened via technology by addressing cost drivers 
or enabling product/service differentiation, (2) use such a linkage to busi- 
ness value as a basis for comparing and prioritizing investments, (3) identify 
and assess the risks associated with IT investments, and (4) revise previous 
assumptions and estimates as uncertainty diminishes over time. We have 
focused on the first two goals. 
The Underlying Economic Theory 
The reason for the existence of an organization is that it performs a set of 
integrated activities more efficiently than the market (see Williamson (1980) 
for the theory of markets and hierarchies). Porter's notion of the "value 
chain" derives from this theory: if we divide a firm's activities into techno- 
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logically and economically distinct activities that are used to "create value1', 
this value can be measured by the amount that buyers are willing to pay for 
its final product or service. To be competitive, a firm must either perform 
these activities at a low cost or perform them in a way that leads to product 
differentiation (and hence premium price or value). Activities have "cost 
drivers" that determine the potential sources of a cost advantage. Similarly, 
a company's ability to differentiate itself derives from the contribution of 
each value activity in the chain toward fulfillment of customer needs. 
In virtually any industry, information technology can be applied to the 
value chain at every point, transforming activities and the linkages among 
them (i.e. it can change the way individual or aggregate activities are per- 
formed). 
The most common type of technology investment is targeted at the cost 
drivers that are the basis of the fundamental revenue generating activities 
of the firm. Technology may reduce costs, or as is more frequently the case, 
reduce the rate at which costs grow with volume by substituting a fixed cost 
(technology) for the variable cost such as labor which typically increases with 
volume. It is less frequent to come across a serious consideration of the firm's 
customers and their degree of satisfaction in the information systems plan- 
ning process. However, this is a potentially important perspective, one that 
enables a firm to differentiate its product in the value chain sense. Making 
this concept operational requires a representation that captures the flows of 
information and products through an organization and indicates how they 
contribute to value as defined from the customer's perspective. 
Our specific objective is to operationalize the value chain concept to the 
point where it actually becomes meaningful to measure (value) business pro- 
cesses along criteria that are meaningful to the business, and to be able to 
assess specifically, how a proposed technology or organizational change can 
impact the values of interest at various levels of the enterprise. Our approach 
is to start with the customer, since this leads to focusing on the metrics that 
can serve as a basis for differentiation. We begin by examining the properties 
of process notations such as BSP and Structured Analysis and show how they 
should be extended in order to incorporate the value chain concept. A pro- 
cedure known as Business Design Technology (BDT) (Flores and Dunham 
(1990)) turns out to have properties that are useful in enabling this linkage. 
We describe the relationship between the BDT and the value chain model 
shortly. In order to illustrate our methodology, we limit the analysis to one 
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part of the insurance industry. We focus on the area of claims processing, 
which is an important core business process in the industry. It should be 
recognized, however, that this is itself only a limited part of the value chain. 
The State of the Art 
The Porter framework has led to several methodologies aimed at enabling 
information systems executives interested in prioritizing information tech- 
nology investments (Buss, 1983; McFarlan, 1984; McKenney and McFarlan, 
1982; Millar, 1984; Parsons, 1983; Cash and Konsynski, 1985; Davey, 1988). 
The framework is used in the ISIS methodology developed by IBM which 
is aimed at executives interested in knowing how much and where to invest 
in information technology. The system combines several of the ideas pro- 
posed by Porter, McFarlan, Buss, Rockart, the Boston Consulting Group 
and others into an easy to use framework that tries to show the impacts of 
IT investments on financial statements. 
The ISIS method involves going through five steps. The first involves an 
analysis of the market direction, based in large part on secondary data from 
Value Line, Standard and Poor's, the U.S. Industrial Outlook and A.M. Best., 
and an analysis of competitive forces in the industry (the bargaining power 
of suppliers, the bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitute products 
or services, and potential new entrants), The second step provides a picture 
on how much the firm is investing in IT reIative to the industry and its 
competitors. This step uses methods aimed at appraising the condition of 
the firm's current applications, highlighting those that are critical to the 
business. The third step identifies those strategic business units where the 
highest returns are likely. This is based on the importance of the business 
unit and that of IS in supporting it. 
The fourth step in ISIS is aimed at prioritizing competing information 
technologies. This is based on the analysis performed in step 1 on market di- 
rection etc, critical success factors (Rockart, 1979), and estimates of benefits 
and doability of the applications. Finally, a detailed business case is built 
for the identified applications based on impacts on the bottom line. This is 
based on historical data and the cost and benefit projections of the chosen 
applications under consideration. 
The major strengths of the ISIS model are twofold. First, it extracts 
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data systematically from the executive through a series of questionnaires, 
and uses this and secondary data to  generate graphs that position the firm 
relative to the industry and its competitors in terms of investment and various 
performance parameters. Broadly speaking, this attempts to address the 
question "how much should we be spending on information technology"? 
Secondly, the process of going through the ISIS exercise forces the executive 
to t ry  and identify those applications that are likely to yield the best returns. 
In other words, it addresses to some extent, the question of )'how do we get 
to where we want to be, given how much we can afford to spend"? 
While the goals of the ISIS method are important ones, its approach 
has some major shortcomings. Although benchmark figures on spending 
compared with the competition are useful information, they can hide the im- 
portant details. Has a firm been investing heavily lately to catch up or is it 
on the verge of implementing major strategic initiatives? Or is it inefficient? 
Or is it simply investing inappropriately? Such questions not addressable by 
looking at the numbers alone. Likewise, simply forcing an executive to iden- 
tify useful applications completely ignores platform issues, namely, building 
a foundation for future applications. Specifically, trying to link all technol- 
ogy investments to ROI encourages an overly short term orientation towards 
informat ion technology. And even at the level of applications, couldn't they 
be better evaluated on how well they fit with the platform plans instead of on 
ROI? Finally, there is no explicit basis or anchor for generating the estimates, 
which could turn out to be off by orders of magnitude. 
Keen (1991) points out that the short term orientation to IT investments 
is in large part an effect of the accounting system which direct costs IT 
expenses (including a large portion of equipment, software development costs, 
data resource development costs, and so on). He proposes that IT (including 
software resources) should be treated as capital instead of overhead. Drawing 
up an "IT balance sheet" shows how the hidden value of this capital can 
be several times that resulting from the direct costing approach. Perhaps 
most importantly, viewing IT investment as a cost leads to the empirically 
supported argument that IT does not provide real benefits to the bottom 
line since it rarely reduces costs (Strassman, 1985; Weill, 1989). It ignores 
the fact that the investment more often reduces future expenses on personnel 
(variable costs) associated with increased business volume rather than costs 
per se. In this light, more pertinent measures might therefore be "sales per 
employee" or "profits per employee", which Keen calls "anchor measures7'. 
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The above "anchor measures" focus largely on the benefits provided in 
terms of making firm operations more efficient or streamlined. In spirit, their 
purpose is similar to that of financial measures like ROI, but the focus is on 
those aspects of the business actually impacted by the technology that are 
not recognized by the cost accounting system. We can use these metrics 
for focusing on the cost drivers. In addition, we need a way to link the 
technology to the all important actor, the customer, and measure it in terms 
of how it can contribute to customer satisfaction by differentiating its product 
or service. 
What Value Metrics Should be Used? 
There are, broadly speaking, two sets of factors involved in evaluating IT 
investments. The first set are inherently qualitative and not amenable to 
measurement except in a very coarse sense. Nevertheless they define impor- 
tant general constraints that technology investments must satisfy. The set of 
risks mentioned earlier (market, technology, implementation, etc) belong to 
this category; while not quantifiable, one can categorize them as high or low 
and take steps to reduce them. In addition, certain types of platform deci- 
sions belong to  this set. For example, Keen (1991) enumerates several policy 
criteria senior management must consider: ensuring that the IT base does 
not block a practical and important business initiative (such as the ability to 
link applications or expand a network), that it enables the firm to respond 
quickly to initiatives by competitors, to form electronic alliances, and so on. 
These criteria, in effect, define the constraints or boundaries within which 
technology must be evaluated. If a proposed technology (platform or appli- 
cation) violates any of them or moves the firm in a direction away from a 
policy criterion, there is little use in evaluating it further. 
If the policy and risk criteria are satisfied, we can attempt to measure 
and contrast alternatives. How the technology is evaluated depends on the 
valuation metrics employed. Porter's model provides a good starting point 
for addressing this question by forcing management to articulate the sources 
of sustainable competitive advantage in the industry, which depend on its 
market structure. For example, if one analyzes the competitive forces within 
the insurance industry, a dominant one is the bargaining power of buyers. 
With increasing competition and improved access of buyers to information, 
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this power is likely to increase. So, what is it that buyers want, and what 
metrics can be used to measure how well the need is being fulfilled? And, 
can this need be satisfied with low risk at  a reasonable cost? Let us address 
this question by considering a core business function of any insurance com- 
pany, namely, claims processing. Assuming that two firms provide identical 
coverages and premiums, what makes one more competitive than the other? 
In other words, what are the metrics that differentiate one from the other? 
There is no standard answer to address this question. One proposal calls 
for using "the Braudel guideline" which advocates considering "the changes 
in the limits of the possible in the structures of everyday life" that the new 
product or service makes possible (Braudel, 1985). An illustration of this 
concept is the phenomenal success of ATMs, contrasted with the miserable 
failure of home banking, a seemingly similar service. Fundamentally, the 
latter does not affect the limits of the possible like dispensing cash on Sundays 
at convenient locations. Instead, it provides extensions from everyday life, 
extensions that turn out to be of marginal value for most normal people. 
For the purposes of our analysis, suppose that the Braudel guideline sug- 
gests that the main factors of interest to the customer are the following: 
time taken to process a claim 
the quality of information provided to the patient/client concerning the 
extent of coverage provided, deductibles, exclusions and so on at the 
time the service is rendered 
Likewise, some of the metrics of interest to the insurance company could 
be the following: 
the time taken to process various types of claims 
the cost of processing various types of claims 
the number of errors for the various types of claims 
the extent of fraudlcreep (i.e. type I and type I1 errors) 
Likewise, the metrics of interest to  the service provider (doctor, garage, 
etc) could be similar to those of the insured. 
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In summary, let us assume that from the standpoint of the insurance com- 
pany, the challenge is to differentiate its service in terms of quick turnaround, 
accuracy, and timely information to the user, while ensuring that the pre- 
mium charged for a desired level of service exceeds the cost of producing it. 
In the next section, we describe how this criterion is operationalized. 
5 A Representation for Business Processes 
Loosely speaking, a firm can be decomposed into "business processes" that 
are responsible for carrying out the essential parts of the business. If tech- 
nology is to be evaluated in terms of how it impacts such processes, we need 
a notation for expressing such processes, and metrics for measuring them. 
The metrics could be a function of time, i.e. sales per empolyee could vary 
over time, although we ignore time in our analysis. 
In designing large business systems, it is common practice to use notations 
that communicate effectively among members of a design team the processes 
of interest, the data that they require, manipulate, and generate. In addition 
to serving the purpose of communication, such a notation also enables a 
design team to proceed top-down, until detailed processes are identified for 
which modules of code can be written. 
There are several process-oriented notations that are commonly used in 
the early stages of the systems development life cycle. Commonly used ones 
are Business Systems Planning (BSP, popularized by IBM in the early 80s; see 
BSP- 1984) and Structured Analysis. Both require identifying the following: 
processes, which are groups of logically related decisions and activi- 
ties required to manage or run the business. These can be thought of 
as similar to Porter's "technologically or economically distinct activi- 
ties" that create value. At the highest level, these might be marketing, 
production, sales, etc. In an insurance company, these could be claims 
analysis, marketing support, billing, outpatient monitoring, and so on. 
A special type of process, often called an external en t i ty  either gen- 
erates or receives data (i.e. does no transformation). 
d a t a  classes, which are data elements used by or generated by pro- 
cesses. Attributes of dala classes characterize what flows among the 
processes. Data can also reside in d a t a  stores. Data flows can in turn 
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have their own attributes such as where they are generated or absorbed, 
the t i m e  they spend between processes and so on. 
input/output relationships; in BSP, these form an "Information 
architecture" which shows what data items are created by or required 
by which processes. In structured analysis, they are shown graphically. 
Sample diagrams showing the above components are shown in Figures 1 
and 2 (Managed-Care Manual 1990). Figire 1 is the highest level depiction 
of a process called claims workflow management. Figure 2 "blows up" 
Figure 1, showing the processes that make up the high level process. It also 
includes additional data flows that were "hidden" in Figure 1. These are 
commonly refered to as dataflow diagrams, for obvious reasons. External 
entities or external systems are shown as rectangles. Processes are shown 
as circles, and data stores or knowledge bases are shown in enclosed parallel 
lines (in Figure 1, sets of databases are shown using the DASD symbol). 
Properties of the Process Not at ion and 
Required Extensions 
It is clear from Figure 1 that the claims workflow management function 
has four objectives specified inside the circle. These are really processes at 
the next lower level, which can in turn be broken down into more detailed 
processes. In other words, objectives or functions can simply be aggregated 
as we move up levels. 
As we proceed to the lower levels, the ambiguity between the input/output 
relationships vanishes (i.e. it becomes clearer which process is using which 
inputs, producing specific outputs, etc). If we work down to the level of detail 
where each process has only one output, such processes can be considered 
"atomic" in that the transformation they represent is unambiguous. 
The process notation is excellent for communicating what actually hap- 
pens in a firm in terms of data flows and transformations. A complex business 
process can be decomposed horizontally and vertically to the extent desired. 
It is also independent of the method actually employed to implement it; a 
process could be manual, automated, or a combination. Its attributes pro- 
vide its description. For example, the processes described previously could 
have the following attributes: 
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objective 
resources used: this is a list of resources such as labor, machinery 
(such as processors) and space. Each of these resources themselves 
could be further categorized as shown in Figure 5 .  Each resource can 
have its own attributes. 
total cost: this is a function defined over the resources used 
processing rate: indicating the rate at which the input is processed 
or the output produced. 
location: where the process is performed. For atomic processes this 
would probably be one value whereas for aggregates it would be a set. 
A simple but fundamental extension we emake to the notation is to associate 
computable attributes with processes which can serve as an indicators of the 
"quality" of the process. Coming up with meaningful numbers, particularly 
for the higher level processes is a challenging detail. Conceptually, however, 
aggregated properties are a function of those of their subprocesses. 
Another required extension is to enable a process flow model to  indicate 
those processes or links that are critical in achieving the more desirable values 
for the metrics. For example, if transporting something from one geographic 
location to another involves delay, and this delay is an impediment to differ- 
entiation, steps must be taken to reduce the delay or to rethink the business 
process so that the transportation step is eliminated altogether. 
The Business Design Technology (BDT) attempts to make the customer 
the driving force behind business design. Motivated to some extent by speech- 
acts theory, it advocates representing every business process as a four part 
"action work flow loop" that makes explicit four states and actions that 
can describes a business process at any level of abstraction. Each action 
can be further decomposed into more detailed work flow loops as shown in 
Figure 3. Every process "begins" from some initial state with an action 
that makes a request or offers a service (leading to a "request state"). This 
state is "accepted" (the second action) by the performer of the service which 
leads to a contract or a mutual agreement state. This agreement is then 
fulfilled (the third action), leading to a new state where the obligation has 
been completed. The customer then declares satisfaction, leading back to a 
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"satisfied" state. The customer need not be an external customer. In fact, 
if we consider a firm's operations, it would be some individual, department, 
or function within the firm. 
The claims function can be described in terms of the BDT model. In 
fact, if the processes in Figure 2 were represented with the BDT, the result 
would be as in Figure 4. Each process is represented in terms of the four 
part transition state network shown in Figure 3. 
Conceptually the difference between the two notations is the following: 
the contents of the dataflow diagram in Figure 2, namely, the processes and 
links, are not based on on any principles of good business design whereas 
those of BDT are (at least there is an attempt to do so). One thing missing 
in the processes of Figure 2 is notion of a customer for each process, and 
because of this absence, the lack of a guideline for how to design a good 
process. Forcing a customer into each process forces a consideration of what 
quality means for that process. Conceptually, this is similar to the notion 
of differentiation in the value chain model, but by forcing it a micro level, 
it applies the concept concretely at the system implementation level. In 
contrast, the DFD notation places the burden of designing good processes 
entirely on the analyst, providing no sound guidelines for how to do so. The 
DFD is also silent on the coordination linkages required among the various 
processes. In contrast, if the work flows are represented as hierarchical, 
nested work loops, it also becomes possible to compute at the level of the 
organization of interest to  the executive, coordination requirements, potential 
sources of delays, and ways to improve overall processing time. If metrics of 
interest are identified for an atomic process, these can be aggregated ("rolled 
up") for the higher level processes. Basically, the aggregated value is some 
function of the component values, where the function can be specified as part 
of the flow model. 
The above attributes are illustrative only. The important thing to note 
is that we have associated values with processes and linkages. Depending 
on the metrics of interest, these provide a precise measure of the value of 
the business process. Even more importantly, it becomes possible to ag- 
gregate these values so that a business process can be analyzed at  any level 
of abstraction. For example, at the highest level, the claims workflow 
management can be viewed as performing several functions. It might have 
associated with it aggregated properties such as processing rates for various 
types of claims (i.e. on average, 1 out of 10 health claims is routed to an 
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adjudicator for resolution whereas 1 out of 100 property claims needs ad- 
judication, health claims are processed at an average of 100 per day with 
an average fraudlcreep rate of 3 percent, property and casualty claims at 
2,000 per day with a fraud rate of 1 percent, the average processing rate 
for all claims is 1,000 claims per day, and so on). Where do these num- 
bers come from? From the lower level processes that deal with the specific 
types of claims (in Figures 2 and 4, and from more detailed "blow ups" of 
its processes). 
This type of functionality requires a sort of "reverse inheritance", where 
the attributes of a higher level object are a function of those below it. For the 
objective attribute, the function is simple: it is simply the set of objectives 
of the objectives of the processes below it. For attributes such as cost, it 
should be the sum of the costs of lower level processes. Other attributes such 
as processing time or delays can be likewise computed deterministically or 
probabilist ically. 
How Can the Model be Used 
Firstly, it would be fruitful to translate the existing process notations of an 
industry such as insurance as in Figures 1 and 2 into BDT based action 
work flow loops. This would provide the baseline model, and indicate the 
weak links, that is, parts that adversely affect customer satisfaction. In 
effect, this analysis should provide the basis for defining the IT platform and 
applications. 
The next step would be to determine how existing processes could be 
"reengineered" through technology or otherwise in order to improve on the 
metrics that are derived from a thorough consideration of customer satis- 
faction. It would be worthwhile developing normatively oriented industry- 
specific models of business processes by industry based on the customer sat- 
isfaction based metrics. Of course, these process models do not specify how 
they can be implemented. Different implementations, based on different uses 
of technology should be comparable at various levels of abstraction in terms 
of how they impact the metrics, and the resources they require. It could 
be that the "ideal" level of service or quality of product requires prohibitive 
levels of resource investment, in which case the tradeoffs must be evaluated. 
The process model also offers the ability to "simulate" the functioning of 
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the business processes, much in the way that a spy plane might trigger an 
enemy's defence systems, highlighting parts that functioned most efficiently, 
those that failed to react as expected, and the unexpected effects induced by 
the input. Inputs such as "assume that the invoice was made out incorrectly 
and repored by the customer" could provide an interesting simulation of the 
business processes, as could queries incorporating aggregated or statistical 
parameters, i.e. "tell me how the system would behave if 15% of the claims 
for over $10,000 are filled out incorrectly by the claimant". Conceptually, 
this is like debugging a program by testing it with a diverse range of inputs 
and if required, producing summary reports of its behavior. It makes sense to 
apply the same methods to business processes since they have a conceptually 
similar structure (nested loops with explicit termination conditions). In sum- 
mary, since the processes have a precise semantics, a meaningful simulation 
should be possible. Such a simulation should be viewable using a graphical 
user interface where processes, coordination linkages, and the value metrics 
associated with them change in response to different types of inputs, or by 
restructuring basic work flows. 
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